19_Independence and Divergence

This is the nineteenth #generalhistory note, following 18_Collapse of the Soviet Union. Some parts run in parallel with 19_Problematic Divorce.

Two countries, two struggles

Summary

• In October 1993, Russian tanks fired on the Russian White House, the seat of parliament, effectively ending parliamentary democracy in Russia and paving the way for a presidential regime.
• Russian democracy only lasted from 1991 to 1993, with Boris Yeltsin ruling the final year by decree.
• In contrast, Ukraine remained democratic (for reasons discussed later), which posed several challenges for Russia:
  • It inspired liberal opposition within Russia.
  • It made it harder for Russia to exert control over Ukraine (as it's more difficult to permanently coerce a rotating parliament than a dictator).
  • It made the West more receptive to Ukraine’s potential membership in its institutions (democracies prefer to cooperate with other democracies).
• These challenges worsened during the Orange Revolution and ultimately edged the countries towards war.

Yeltsin paves way to dictatorship

• In September 1993, Yeltsin unconstitutionally dissolved both the Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet.
• He did this because the parliament was challenging his power, hindering his ability to carry out his economic reforms, known as "shock therapy." In 1992, parliament had trusted Yeltsin to implement these reforms, granting him emergency powers to rescue Russia from economic turmoil.
• However, Yeltsin failed, and by December 1992, the parliament voted to end his emergency powers. Yeltsin protested, demanding a new constitution. This power struggle led to a compromise: Yeltsin would have an adversarial prime minister until a referendum in April 1993 could decide on a new constitution.
• Despite the April referendum supporting Yeltsin’s constitution, the Congress continued to resist him, leading Yeltsin to dissolve it outright.
• This action de jure stripped Yeltsin of his authority under the existing constitution.
• His Vice President denounced the move and formally sided with the parliament, which barricaded itself inside the White House.
• However, with the backing of the military, Yeltsin was able to crush the opposition, using tank fire to literally bombard the parliament building. He took this opportunity to shut down political organizations and censor critical newspapers.
• Yeltsin masterfully marketed this attack on democracy as a defense of it. So effectively, in fact, that U.S. President Bill Clinton congratulated him, and the Russian people approved his new constitution. Yeltsin branded his opponents as “fascists,” which resonated deeply in Russia (given its WWII legacy) and worldwide.
• While the public supported Yeltsin, they did not support his economic reforms, as shown by the crushing defeat of his party in the parliamentary elections. The Liberal Democratic Party, a neofascist party, won the elections.
• Fortunately for Yeltsin, this no longer mattered much. His constitutional reforms had rendered the parliament largely irrelevant, setting Russia on a path toward authoritarianism. Ironically, Yeltsin justified his actions as necessary to save democracy from the authoritarian forces in parliament.

Underlying Reasons for Russia’s Democratic Failure

• Russia's attempt at democracy was undermined by several deep-rooted factors:
  • National Humiliation: The collapse of both the outer (Warsaw Pact) and inner (Soviet Union) empires left Russia grappling with a profound sense of humiliation.
  • Executive Power Tradition: Historically, Russia’s chief executive (tsar, general secretary, or president) held immense power, making it difficult to transition to a true balance of power.
  • Authoritarian Legacy: Powerful institutions rooted in authoritarianism persisted, providing a fallback to more familiar autocratic governance.
  • Rising Nationalism: Nationalism, stoked by the loss of empire, prevailed over democratic ideals.
  • Economic Dependency on Oil: Russia’s struggling economy remained heavily dependent on oil exports, which fueled corruption and undermined democratic reforms.
  • Militarization: Ongoing conflicts, such as the wars in Chechnya, kept the military a dominant force, reinforcing authoritarian tendencies.

Ukraine's Democratic Success

• Ukraine’s democratic path differed fundamentally from Russia’s, shaped by its unique context:

Key Differences

• Regional Diversity Over Nationalism: Ukraine’s weaker sense of nationalism was offset by its regional diversity, allowing for a more pluralistic political environment.
• Economic Crisis Without Oil Dependency: While Ukraine faced economic downturns, it lacked the heavy reliance on oil that hindered Russia’s reform process.
• Underdeveloped Political Elites: The ruling parties were underdeveloped, which paradoxically worked in favor of democracy, as no single group could dominate.
• East-West Divides: National divisions between eastern and western Ukraine prevented the rise of a centralized authoritarian power.
• Lack of Strong Institutions: Unlike Russia, Ukraine didn’t have powerful institutions to impose autocracy. This vacuum meant institutions were built from the ground up, aligning more naturally with democratic norms. It also made it harder for elites to manipulate elections, keep allies in check, or violently suppress dissent.
• Independence as a Shared Victory: For most Ukrainians and their elites, the fall of the Soviet Union was seen as a triumph, fostering a more hopeful view of democracy.
• No Recent Statehood Memory: Without the heavy legacy of a strong centralized state, Ukrainian politics remained competitive, driven by regionalism and a lack of a single dominant narrative.
• Strong Regionalism: While no single national narrative took hold, Ukraine didn’t fully splinter, as regional elites competed for more favorable conditions than those offered under Soviet rule.
• In Ukraine, as in Russia, the economy and the reaction to the dissolution of the USSR were the two main issues that dictated political discourse, often with the parliament and president having different positions. However, those issues played out very differently in Ukraine, where the political elite were vastly different to those in Russia in that they enhanced the enhanced the democratic process instead of undermining it.
• One of these key elites was Leonid Kravchuk, the first president of Ukraine. Kravchuk and Yeltsin were very different, though they shared ambitions (Kravchuk also disliked his parliament- in his case the Verkhovna Rada).
  • Unlike Yeltsin, he didn't have the backing of the political elite and society at large.
  • Yeltsin was a regional party boss, Kravchuk a quintessential apparatchik who worked for the propaganda apparatus of the Ukrainian central committee
  • Yeltsin left the Communist party early, protesting the pace of Gorbachevs reforms, while Kravchuk remained loyal to the bitter end.
  • Yeltsin became head of parliament against the will of the party leadership, Kravchuk was explicitly supported by it and then took the helm of the Ukrainian parliament
  • Yeltsin ran against a communist supported by the Kremlin, Kravchuk against a liberal democrat that survived the gulag
  • Yeltsin was a charismatic populist that was very opportunistic, Kravchuk was a cunning apparatchik and consensus builder.
• These differences would be the key to Kravchuk's success as he led a country very different from Russia and had to deal with a very different parliament. The main difference from Russia was probably it's east-west divide, which was already touched upon but will now be elaborated upon.
  • The Ukrainian east was home to millions of ethnic Russians, a result of Russification policies implemented throughout much of Russian and later Soviet control.
  • The center of Ukraine remained largely rural and ethnically Ukrainian, as Russification efforts were primarily focused on urban areas.
  • The west had historically been part of Central European states and was strongly pro-Western. It was also deeply nationalist, a sentiment fueled by the interwar Ukrainian government being established there and later sustained by the anti-Soviet guerrilla war waged by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army from the late 1940s to early 1950s.

Economic developments

• As in Russia, the "democrats" emerged as the most influential force in early post-Soviet Ukrainian politics. However, unlike in Russia, Ukraine lacked pre-existing institutions to support state-building, which became the primary focus of its new leadership.
• In Russia, the main priority was economic reform, but in Ukraine, parliament lacked the mandate to pursue such changes, and the public was largely opposed to them. Economic reforms, which would have brought hardship, risked destabilizing an already fragile country. A 1993 poll found that only 19% of Ukrainians were willing to endure economic difficulties to strengthen and maintain independence, while 44% were not. Support for economic sacrifice was concentrated in the west, whereas opposition was stronger in the south and east.
• This resulted in Ukraine initially resisting, then delaying, and finally implementing reforms.
• Although it initially delayed the negative consequences, the approach ultimately led to some serious problems. While Russia experienced steady and significant GDP drops from 1992 to 1994 (15% in 1992, 9% in 1993, 13% in 1994), Ukraine's GDP also declined, though less severely at first. However, it eventually plummeted during the same period (10%, followed by 14%, and finally a staggering 23%).
• Complicating matters further, the Ukrainian parliament resorted to printing money (something Yeltsin prohibited in Russia), which led to hyperinflation, peaking at a staggering 10,256%.
• As in Russia, the economic turmoil triggered a political crisis. However, instead of granting Kravchuk the right to rule by decree, the Verkhovna Rada temporarily handed that power to the prime minister, whose position depended on parliamentary support.
• This created a power struggle between the president and the prime minister, which essentially paralyzed the executive branch and worsened the economic crisis. The situation deteriorated so much that miners from Donbas marched on Kyiv to protest and present their demands.
• Like Yeltsin, Kravchuk sought to resolve the crisis through a referendum on a new constitution, but mass protests in Kyiv led to its cancellation. Instead, new parliamentary and presidential elections were scheduled for the following year.

New Election and Constitution

• Kravchuk framed the election as a referendum on Ukrainian independence, positioning himself as its creator and defender. His opponent, Leonid Kuchma—a former prime minister and director of Europe’s largest missile production facility—ran on a platform of rebuilding economic ties with Russia.
• The electoral map split along an east-west axis: Kravchuk garnered support from the largely Ukrainian-speaking, rural center and the nationalist west, while Kuchma attracted the Russian-speaking south and east.
• Neither candidate secured a majority in the first round, leading to a run-off where Kuchma won with 52% of the vote to Kravchuk's 45%. Kravchuk accepted the result without protest, marking a historic moment for Ukraine as it peacefully transferred power through free and fair elections—something Russia had never managed.
• However, the parliamentary elections resulted in a victory for the communists, complicating matters. Kuchma wanted to push for privatization, but parliament opposed it. Unlike in Russia, where the president could have pushed through such policies unilaterally under the new constitution, Kuchma’s power was constrained by Ukraine’s parliament.
• Frustrated, Kuchma threatened to hold a referendum unless a new constitution was adopted. Sensing the danger, parliament acted swiftly. The urgency increased in 1996 when a communist presidential candidate in Russia came close to winning, fueling fears of a renewed Soviet Union if Ukraine's parliament and a communist president in Russia teamed up.
• In 1996, the Ukrainian parliament adopted Kuchma's new constitution, creating a mixed presidential-parliamentary system. This new constitution gave the president the power to veto laws and, in certain cases, dissolve parliament, while parliament retained the authority to appoint the prime minister and key cabinet members, amend the constitution, and conduct referendums.
• As a result, Ukraine's parliament survived as an independent and powerful institution, capable of directly challenging the president.

Political Developments

• Equally importantly, Ukraine maintained diverse political representation, with no party or regional elite able to dominate the country's politics. Compromise became the only way to resolve disputes among powerholders.
• This remained true as political elites shifted over time. Communist party bosses, "red directors" who benefited from privatization under Kuchma, and the emerging oligarchs all adhered to this unwritten rule of compromise.
• Nation-building became the central issue in Ukrainian politics. Unlike in Russia, where nationalists and communists could often align, Ukraine’s nationalists, advocating for closer ties with the West and reform, stood in stark opposition to the communists, who supported deeper ties with Russia and resisted reform.
• Ukraine’s cultural and regional diversity, shaped by centuries of foreign rule, contributed significantly to this political pluralism. The nationalists in the west pushed for an end to reliance on Russia, while the communists, dominating the east and south, argued for maintaining ties with Russia, especially given Ukraine's dependence on Russian energy supplies.
• The central region of Ukraine, caught between these opposing forces, became a battleground of ideas, ultimately acting as a stabilizing force that promoted moderation and compromise.
• Culturally, the main link between ethnic Ukrainians who also spoke Ukrainian and the Russian-speaking ethnic Russians was formed by the millions of Russified ethnic Ukrainians, helping to bridge the divide between these two groups.
• Crucially, elites in Kyiv viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as an opportunity for personal gain, incentivizing them to preserve Ukraine's newfound sovereignty and democracy, despite their disagreements over the direction of society. In contrast to the defeat and resentment felt in Moscow, Ukraine’s leadership looked toward the future with a sense of hope, even amidst severe economic challenges.

Russia walks Yeltsins way

Summary

• The same presidential elections that compelled the Ukrainian parliament to reach a compromise with Kuchma ultimately set Russia on the path to "managed democracy," a system in which a dictatorship is effectively legitimized by a manipulated electoral process.

Presidential Elections

• In 1995, leading up to the presidential elections, the Russian communists—the main power in parliament—sponsored a vote in the Duma aimed at renouncing the 1991 Belavezha Accords, which had dissolved the Soviet Union.
• The resolution passed with 250 deputies voting in favor and only 98 against. Although the vote was non-binding (as the Duma had no authority to enforce it), it was widely viewed as a direct challenge to Yeltsin’s authority and legitimacy.
• Yeltsin immediately denounced the vote, portraying it as an attack on Russian statehood itself.
• While it remains unclear if the communists genuinely aimed to restore the Soviet Union, it’s certain they intended to unseat Yeltsin in the upcoming presidential election. Their leader, Gennady Zyuganov, enjoyed approval ratings of around 20%, while Yeltsin’s hovered between just 5% and 8%.
• Influential members of Yeltsin’s circle, including his close bodyguard Aleksandr Korzhakov, urged him to ban the communist party, delay the election until 1998, and rule by decree. Yeltsin initially agreed, and preparations began. It seemed Russian democracy was once again on the brink, under the pretext of being preserved. However, reformists within his administration, led by privatization architect Anatoly Chubais, resisted.
• Chubais confronted Yeltsin in a meeting arranged by Yeltsin’s daughter. According to Chubais, Yeltsin felt ashamed afterward, abruptly halted all election delays, and expelled Korzhakov and his group from the Kremlin. Choosing the democratic path, Yeltsin appointed Chubais as his campaign manager.
• For his campaign, Yeltsin relied on familiar strategies, positioning himself as a bulwark against a communist resurgence. Budget resources were redirected toward pensions and salaries, and government officials were urged to secure a pro-Yeltsin vote.
• Yeltsin’s shock therapy had cost him popularity, but it also fostered a loyal class of ultra-wealthy oligarchs who discreetly committed their support. In late 1995, a coalition of Russian bankers made a covert deal with Yeltsin’s office, pledging to:
  • Leverage their media holdings to bolster Yeltsin’s campaign
  • Influence voters and regional elites with construction projects.
• In return, they received shares in state-owned businesses at substantial discounts.
• Despite a mid-campaign heart attack, Yeltsin led a full-force campaign. He bested Zyuganov in the first round, 36% to 32%, and secured victory in the second round with a 54% to 41% margin.
• Yeltsin’s success was bolstered by the state apparatus, backing from oligarchs, and support in the second round from Aleksandr Lebed, who had by then joined Yeltsin’s government as Secretary of the Security Council.

Operation successor

• Yeltsin saw his victory as a mandate to continue his economic reforms.
• However, hopes for Russian economic recovery were crushed by the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which dealt a severe blow to the Russian economy, leading to 87% inflation in 1998.
• This posed a new problem for the Russian political system. The next presidential election was set for 2000, but Yeltsin’s deteriorating health ruled out his running again, and the constitution barred a third term. This raised the question of succession—a question Yeltsin believed was his to answer.
• He intended to identify a suitable successor and use the support of loyal oligarchs to replicate his 1996 election strategy.
• The succession plan involved the prime minister's office. Yeltsin’s successor, however, couldn’t achieve it as he had (through his role as parliamentary speaker) due to the hostile Duma, which made that path impossible.
• Yeltsin’s first choice was Sergei Stepashin, who had to meet two criteria to be selected as successor:
  • Demonstrate loyalty to Yeltsin
  • Gain popularity
• Stepashin failed by:
  • Compromising with Yeltsin’s political opponents, indicating he might not protect him after his term
  • Failing to address the Chechnya conflict
• By August, Stepashin was out, replaced by the FSB chief and Security Council secretary, Vladimir Putin.
• Putin, a former KGB officer, had previously worked under Anatolii Sobchak, Yeltsin’s ally in St. Petersburg. After Sobchak lost the 1996 election, Putin moved to Moscow, where he developed ties with oligarchs and political insiders, particularly Valentin Yumashev, who succeeded Anatoly Chubais as head of the presidential administration. Yumashev, Yeltsin’s son-in-law, was a member of Yeltsin’s close circle, or "family," a term for his trusted allies and personal confidants, of which Yumashev was a prime example.
• This “family” chose Putin as Yeltsin’s successor. However, before finalizing this decision, Putin needed to fulfill the two objectives that Stepashin had failed to achieve.
• Putin had already proven his loyalty to Yeltsin, notably by targeting the president’s adversaries. As FSB head, he released videotape showing Yeltsin critic Yurii Skuratov in a compromising position with prostitutes. Skuratov had previously coordinated security efforts against Yeltsin’s political opponents; after the scandal, his career was effectively over. This move bolstered Putin’s standing, and he was subsequently appointed as Security Council secretary, positioning him for the role of prime minister.
• To gain popularity, Putin orchestrated a remarkable transformation after his appointment. Once a low-profile bureaucrat barely known among the elite, let alone the public, he became Russia’s most popular politician within a few months. In August, only 2% of voters supported him; by year-end, this had surged to 51%.
• Putin achieved this by:
  • Leveraging state-controlled media
  • Receiving assistance from friendly oligarchs, who, through their media outlets, depicted him as a dynamic, decisive leader ready to protect Russia from internal and external threats.
• Yeltsin bolstered this image by tasking Putin with addressing Chechen rebels attempting to establish an Islamic state in Dagestan. Putin capitalized on this, and in response to subsequent terrorist attacks, publicly threatened these enemies, showcasing his resolve to address the issue.
• Some observers argue that both the rebel incursion and the terrorist attacks were either staged or provoked by Russian security services to boost Putin’s popularity, making him appear strong enough to gain voter support in the upcoming election.

Chechnya

• Chechnya had become a focal issue in Russian politics even before the collapse of the Soviet Union.
• Chechen forces supported Yeltsin during the August 1991 coup attempt in Moscow, hoping to gain independence in return.
• However, Yeltsin and his allies drew a clear line between Union republics and autonomous regions within Russia, using the former’s borders as the basis for new independent states.
• Already in the fall of 1991, Yeltsin considered deploying the military to suppress Chechnya’s independence movement, but low troop morale and Gorbachev’s disapproval (he still controlled the Union’s military) thwarted the effort.
• On November 1, 1991, Chechnya, renaming itself Ichkeria, declared independence. It then took advantage of Moscow’s chaos in the early 1990s to assert this declaration in practice.
• This situation persisted until 1994 when Yeltsin again ordered his forces into the region, aiming to capture the regional capital, Grozny. (For a detailed analysis, see Mark Galeotti’s Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine; I’ll offer a brief summary here.)
• The essence of the campaign was that Russian forces managed to take Grozny in 1995, but only after incurring devastating losses and bombarding large areas with air and artillery. The rebels retreated into the mountains, regrouped, and continued to inflict heavy casualties on the occupying forces, even after their leader, General Dudaev, was killed in a missile strike. His successor, Aslan Maskhadov, retook Grozny in August 1996.
• By then, Alexander Lebed, head of the Security Council, signed a ceasefire with Chechen leaders. Under this agreement, Russian forces withdrew.
• This left Chechnya in an ambiguous state: de facto independent but not recognized by Russia or the international community. Economically devastated, the country fell largely under the control of warlords, with Maskhadov, who won the 1997 presidential election, effectively governing only Grozny and its surroundings.
• These warlords, facing dire economic circumstances, resorted to kidnapping for ransom. Some radical factions even launched terrorist attacks within Russia.
• The warlords also shifted their ideology from nationalism to radical Islamism, and only Middle Eastern countries with similar leanings recognized their republic.
• This Islamist influence fueled an incursion into Dagestan in 1999 and a declaration of the Islamic State of Dagestan. Although the Chechen government did not officially endorse these actions, they led to renewed war with Russia. Many argue the attack served Moscow’s domestic political agenda too well to be mere chance, suggesting potential involvement by Russian security services.
• Russia’s renewed campaign (again, for more detail, see Mark Galeotti’s Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine) began in late August 1999 with intense aerial bombardments that displaced over 100,000 people, destabilizing nearby Russian regions.
• In September, a series of apartment bombings in Moscow killed over 300 civilians. Although initial blame fell on Chechen forces, some evidence suggests possible FSB involvement. This theory is supported by an incident in Ryazan, 200 kilometers southeast of Moscow, where local police caught FSB agents planting explosives in an apartment building. The FSB later claimed it was an anti-terrorist drill.
• Regardless of responsibility, the attacks gave Putin the mandate to launch a full-scale invasion of Chechnya.
• The invasion began in October 1999, with Putin denouncing Maskhadov’s rule as illegitimate and announcing the objective of partitioning Chechnya to establish a northern buffer zone. Maskhadov’s calls for peace were ignored as Russian forces advanced, inflicting severe harm on the civilian population.
• By December, Russian forces reached Grozny, devastating what remained from the previous war. The city fell in February 2000, and the UN declared it the most destroyed city in the world.
• By May, Putin installed a puppet regime in Chechnya, first led by Akhmat Kadyrov and later by his son, Ramzan Kadyrov, though there was a transitional period between their leaderships.

Operation Successor Successful

• Meanwhile, Putin had assumed the Russian presidency, officially moving into the Kremlin on May 7. During his New Year’s Eve address on December 31, 1999, Yeltsin surprised the nation by resigning, leaving Putin, whose approval rating had surpassed fifty percent that month, as acting president. This gave Putin full control over the military, government, state media, and administrative resources, all of which he intended to use to secure his presidency in true Russian style.
• Earlier in December, a new law had been passed requiring presidential candidates to gather one million signatures and regulating campaign finances, a measure that strongly favored Putin as the government-supported candidate.
• Although opposition candidates had expected elections to take place in the summer of 2000, the date was moved up to spring, leaving them, particularly Moscow Mayor Yurii Luzhkov, with insufficient time to prepare. This eventually led Luzhkov to withdraw his candidacy, followed by Yevgenii Primakov.
• This shift effectively cleared the political center for Putin alone, who subsequently won the election in the first round with 53 percent of the vote. His Communist Party opponent, Gennady Zyuganov, secured 22 percent, while the liberal candidate, Grigory Yavlinsky, finished with 6 percent.
• Operation Successor had succeeded; the "family" had placed Putin in power, and he reciprocated with his first presidential decree, granting them immunity from criminal charges.

Recap

• This effectively ended the Yeltsin era in Russian politics, leaving behind a significant legacy.
• As a former Communist official determined to establish democracy, Yeltsin employed authoritarian methods to achieve it. He guided Russia out of the Soviet Union on a wave of democratic reform, yet simultaneously undermined that same wave, instead creating a super-presidential republic.
• Most significantly, Yeltsin established a succession system where the incumbent could choose their successor. His successor, Putin, would fully exploit the super-presidential system, transforming it into an autocratic regime—an approach that would profoundly shape both domestic and foreign policy.

Orange Revolution

Lead-up

Kuchma's Re-election and Second Term

• While Yeltsin was preparing to hand over power to Putin in 1999, Leonid Kuchma was gearing up to run for his second term as Ukraine’s president.
• In his first term, he had stabilized the economy by privatizing large sectors and fostering favorable relations with Western institutions like the IMF.
• He had also managed to create a political equilibrium by implementing a power-sharing system. However, this did not stabilize the political landscape entirely, as the president and parliament remained divided over the country’s future direction.
• The global financial crisis of 1997 and the subsequent Russian default in 1998 had severe repercussions for Ukraine, boosting the Communist Party in the 1998 parliamentary elections, where they secured the largest share of votes (25%). The national democrats, led by former dissident Viacheslav Chornovil, came in second with 10% of the vote, followed by Kuchma's People's Democratic Party with only 5%.
• By 1999, Kuchma found himself in a situation similar to Yeltsin's in 1996. Following a similar strategy, he positioned himself as the defender against communism, appealing to:
  • The industrial elites in the east, who had benefited greatly from his privatization policies and lent him media support.
  • The western part of the country, which valued independence and sought closer ties with Europe.
• With backing from oligarchs and state-controlled media, he won both the east and west, losing only in the rural center, still heavily influenced by the collective farming system. Kuchma ultimately defeated his Communist Party opponent, Petro Symonenko, with 58% of the vote to Symonenko’s 39%.
• Following his victory, Kuchma shifted toward integrating Ukraine into European political and economic structures, beginning with appointing Viktor Yushchenko as prime minister. Yushchenko, a former head of Ukraine’s National Bank and an IMF favorite, brought in his ally Yulia Tymoshenko as deputy prime minister.
• Together, Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko halted Ukraine's economic decline within a little over a year by:
  • Closing tax loopholes exploited by big businesses and emerging oligarchic clans.
  • Ensuring back wages, salaries, and pensions were paid.
• This led to an economic recovery, with metallurgical and mining industries doubling exports, eventually spurring sustained growth that extended into the early 2000s.

Kuchmagate

• After his victory, Kuchma leveraged his position to renegotiate power with parliament. First, he pressured the communists into accepting a new pro-presidential parliamentary leadership and then called a referendum on expanding presidential powers.
• With 81% voter turnout, 83–91% of participants approved extensive changes to the parliamentary structure, including making it bicameral, reducing the number of deputies by two-thirds, allowing for criminal prosecution of deputies, and granting the president authority to dissolve parliament if it failed to form a stable majority within a month.
• Kuchma aimed to rewrite the constitution, as Yeltsin had, but faced strong opposition that questioned the referendum's validity. Lacking the necessary votes for constitutional amendments, his agenda stalled.
• Tensions escalated into a full-blown scandal when Oleksandr Moroz, leader of the Socialist Party, leaked secret tapes of Kuchma's office conversations. The tapes revealed corruption schemes, plans to suppress political opponents, and, most damningly, Kuchma ordering his interior minister to kidnap journalist Heorhii Gongadze.
• Gongadze had disappeared in September and was later found decapitated in a forest near Kyiv. Although Kuchma denied ordering the journalist’s murder, the tapes captured him demanding Gongadze's abduction and forced exile. It was later confirmed that the journalist was killed by a secret death squad under Interior Minister Kravchenko, who later died under suspicious circumstances in a purported suicide involving two gunshots to the head.
• In December 2000, a coalition of opposition leaders, including socialists like Moroz and populists like Tymoshenko, led street protests demanding Kuchma's resignation.
• This set off a cascade of events:
  • Kuchma abandoned his reformist stance, ousted the Western-backed Prime Minister Yushchenko, and distanced himself from his previous pro-European stance.
  • Western leaders called for an impartial investigation into Gongadze’s murder.
  • Kuchma turned to Putin for political support, abandoning his plans for European integration.
• While few doubted that Kuchma had ordered Gongadze’s kidnapping and intended exile—possibly to Chechnya—the circumstances of the recordings, captured by Kuchma’s bodyguard, Mykola Melynchenko, remain unclear.
• What is widely accepted is that top Ukrainian security officials, later working closely with Russian counterparts, orchestrated these recordings.
• The main beneficiary of the scandal and Kuchma’s resulting weakened position was Vladimir Putin, who exploited the resulting rift between Ukraine and the West, extracting key concessions from Kuchma, including:
  • Ukraine's participation in Russia-led Eurasian forums and organizations, enhancing economic ties with Moscow and pushing Ukraine back into the post-Soviet sphere (one example in 20_Contact with Europe) .
  • The exclusion of NATO membership from Ukraine's military doctrine.

2004 Election

• Kuchma did not run again for office, as the Ukrainian constitution barred candidates from seeking more than two terms. While he considered arguing that his first term predated the current constitution, he ultimately opted for the Yeltsin approach: finding a successor who would protect his interests.
• He chose Viktor Yanukovych, the governor of the Donetsk oblast and leader of Ukraine's largest regional clan. Yanukovych was appointed prime minister in 2002 and led the largest pro-presidential party.
• Yanukovych's main opponent in the election was Viktor Yushchenko, the head of the largest party in parliament at the time.
• The 2004 presidential campaign became the dirtiest in Ukrainian history, with Yanukovych’s camp using state media, administrative pressure, financial handouts to vulnerable social groups, and the financial clout of the Donetsk clan to secure victory. They also sought support in the east by portraying Yushchenko as hostile toward Russians and Russian speakers, claiming he would restrict their rights.
• When these tactics didn’t yield the desired results, they escalated to an act of terrorism. In September, Yushchenko, then 50 years old, fell ill and was diagnosed with dioxin poisoning. The individuals suspected of orchestrating the poisoning fled to Russia, where they found safe haven.
• Remarkably, Yushchenko survived the poisoning, recovered, and gained a popularity boost from the incident.
• As a result, when Ukrainians cast their votes on October 31st, exit polls by several agencies and institutions indicated a Yushchenko lead. However, the Central Electoral Commission announced that Yanukovych had won with 49% to Yushchenko’s 47%.

Revolution

• Yushchenko's supporters, unwilling to accept the election results—especially with numerous reports of irregularities and later a Supreme Court ruling supporting their case—took to the streets. Within days, nearly 500,000 protesters gathered in Kyiv’s Independence Square, setting up a tent city and launching what became known as the Orange Revolution, named after Yushchenko’s campaign colors. Protesters came from not only Kyiv but also other provinces across Ukraine.
• Several factors contributed to the revolution’s outbreak:
  • A protracted conflict between the legislative and presidential branches
  • A split among oligarchs over whom to support
  • Kuchma’s lukewarm backing of Yanukovych
  • Political and regional pluralism in Ukraine, with the west leaning toward Ukrainian identity and ties with the liberal West
• Faced with massive protests and a divided elite, Kuchma chose not to follow Yeltsin’s example by ordering a violent crackdown, as had occurred in Moscow in 1993, and resisted Yanukovych’s urgings for a forceful response. Instead, he brokered a compromise. Yanukovych's camp agreed to a re-vote in exchange for Yushchenko’s commitment to amend the constitution, reducing presidential powers.
• On December 26th, in the third round of the presidential elections, Yushchenko won with 52% of the vote, to Yanukovych’s 44%.

Recap

• The political crisis that began in 2000, when Kuchma consolidated more power in the presidency, ended in December 2004 with a reduction in presidential prerogatives.
• Some of these powers were transferred to the prime minister, whose authority would depend on shifting political dynamics in parliament.
• Thus, Ukraine entered the new millennium as a presidential-parliamentary republic with shared governing powers. While this system preserved democracy, it had its drawbacks: the president and prime minister could not independently implement policy, which often led to gridlock and limited decisive action.
• In his final year in office, Kuchma published his memoir, titled Ukraine is Not Russia. Drawing from his own experience of unsuccessfully attempting to impose a Russian-style system on Ukraine, Kuchma’s book delivered a clear message about Ukraine’s distinct identity. Ironically, the book became available in Moscow before it did in Kyiv, though few in Russia, particularly in power, took its message to heart.

Continuation

Continues in 20_Contact with Europe.

Sources

The information is derived from Serhii Plokhy's book: "The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History" (Pages 34-63) and Mark Galeottis book: Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine.