19_Problematic Divorce

This is the nineteenth #generalhistory notes and branches of off 18_Collapse of the Soviet Union. Parts run in parallel to 19_Independence and Divergence.

The Nuclear Issue

Summary

• Independent Ukraine initially possessed a nuclear arsenal, inheriting 1,900 nuclear warheads and 2,500 tactical nuclear weapons stationed there during Soviet times.
• This made the international community uneasy, with the U.S. concerned about the potential for a “Yugoslavia with nukes” emerging from the Soviet collapse.
• While no large-scale conflicts broke out among the former Soviet states, the situation wasn’t straightforward. Territorial disputes persisted—Ukraine, for instance, faced Russian claims over Crimea and particularly Sevastopol. Russia’s parliament asserted that Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine had been illegal and even claimed Sevastopol as part of the Russian Federation.
• Russia sought Ukraine’s disarmament to ensure its own dominance in the post-Soviet region.
• Though Ukraine lacked operational control over the nuclear arsenal (it didn’t have the launch codes), many Ukrainian leaders believed that simply possessing the weapons gave Ukraine valuable leverage in negotiations with Russia on territorial disputes—a strategic asset they were reluctant to relinquish.
• This stance evolved over time:
  • Right after independence, Ukraine was initially pro-denuclearization, partly due to the lasting impact of the Chernobyl disaster, leading them to impose a moratorium on new nuclear power plant construction.
  • This position was reinforced as Ukraine realized that renouncing nuclear arms would expedite its international recognition. Non-nuclear status was formally embedded in Ukraine’s 1990 Declaration of Sovereignty.
• Major doubts, however, surfaced in fall 1991, following Ukraine’s declaration of independence and Russia’s response.
• Statements from Boris Yeltsin’s press secretary after the independence vote implied that Russia would only respect Ukraine’s borders within a union with Russia.
• After this, several Ukrainian MPs expressed hesitation about disarmament, facing a dilemma:
  • Ukraine needed to eliminate its nuclear arsenal to gain international recognition.
  • But relinquishing these arms risked weakening Ukraine’s bargaining power in securing territorial integrity against Russia.
• In October 1991, Ukraine sought a compromise: it committed to denuclearization for U.S. support, reserving the right to oversee the non-use of nuclear weapons on its territory. In December, parliament voted to ratify the CIS creation documents on the condition of international oversight for dismantling Ukraine’s nuclear arsenal.

Crimea

• The dissolution of empires often leaves behind territorial disputes, and the Soviet Union was no exception.
• Almost immediately after Ukraine declared independence on August 24, 1991, challenges arose from Russian leadership. Pavel Voshchanov, President Yeltsin's spokesperson, stated:

"In that regard, I have been empowered by the President of the RSFSR to make the following declaration. The Russian Federation casts no doubt on the constitutional right of every state and people to self-determination. But there is the problem of borders, which may prove to be unregulated, a condition admissible only if provision is made for Union relations secured by an appropriate treaty. Should they be abrogated, the RSFSR reserves the right to pose the question of revision of borders."

• When pressed for specifics, Voshchanov singled out Ukraine and Kazakhstan, implying that if these states refused a union with Russia, their sovereignty might not be recognized. He further remarked:

“If those republics enter into a union with Russia, then there is no problem. But if they withdraw, then we must be concerned about the population living there and not forget that those lands were colonized by Russians. Russia will hardly agree to give them away so easily.”

• This declaration sparked protests in Kyiv and Almaty. Yeltsin distanced himself from Voshchanov, presenting him as a rogue official expressing personal opinions rather than official policy. However, this was untrue. Voshchanov’s remarks foreshadowed Russia’s long-term strategy: its recognition of post-Soviet neighbors’ sovereignty was conditional on their remaining in Russia's sphere of influence.
• Ukraine was a prime example of this approach. Over the decades, it remained tied to Russia through various structures, from the Soviet Union to the CIS and later Eurasian alliances led by Vladimir Putin. Regardless of the framework, Russia's recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity hinged on its continued alignment with Moscow (a policy whose consequences we will examine when Ukraine sought to break away).
• Voshchanov later clarified that Russia’s primary concerns were the Donbas and Crimea. Crimea, in particular, was a contentious issue due to its majority Russian population and its relatively recent transfer to Ukraine in 1954. The transfer, driven by economic logic, aimed to integrate Crimea more effectively with the Ukrainian mainland, upon which it depended.
• While the majority in Crimea, like in every other oblast, voted for Ukrainian independence, the margin was narrower. Complicating matters was the widespread belief—across political lines—that Russia had a legitimate historical claim to the peninsula and should act on it.
• In January 1992, the Russian parliament passed a resolution questioning the legality of Crimea's transfer to Ukraine. This move forced Ukraine to justify its sovereignty over Crimea, a position that weakened its negotiating stance on the division of the Black Sea Fleet and the status of Sevastopol.
  • Ukraine argued that the fleet was its rightful share of the Soviet Navy's inheritance.
  • Russia claimed the fleet as part of its strategic forces, effectively demanding control.
• While Yeltsin publicly criticized the parliamentary resolution, he privately agreed with figures like Anatolii Sobchak (Putin’s then-boss) that Russia could not relinquish the Black Sea Fleet, regardless of Ukraine’s claims.
• Yeltsin underscored this position during a visit to Novorossiysk, where he boarded the Moskva(a vessel later sunk by Ukraine in April 2022) and met Admiral Igor Kasatonov, commander of the fleet.
• Yeltsin’s strategy followed a plan by Vladimir Lukin, Russia’s first ambassador to the U.S. Lukin proposed using Crimea’s sovereignty as leverage to weaken Ukraine’s position in Black Sea Fleet negotiations.
• In April 1992, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk assumed control of all Soviet forces on Ukrainian territory. Yeltsin retaliated by issuing an order subordinating the Black Sea Fleet to Russia.
• During this period, Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi visited Crimea, echoing the parliamentary position. He dismissed the 1954 transfer as illegitimate, stating:

“Common sense dictates that Crimea becomes part of Russia. Those who signed the decision of 1954 were evidently inebriated or suffering from sunstroke.”

• Meanwhile, Sergei Stankevich, one of Yeltsin’s advisors, also publicly questioned the legality of Crimea’s transfer to Ukraine.

Small Crimean History Detour

• Most of what is outlined here is explored in more detail in the earlier chapters of General History Notes.
• Ironically, the 1954 transfer of Crimea—which modern-day imperialists often criticize to justify their actions—was supported at the time by imperialist propaganda. This propaganda leveraged the tercentenary of the "Reunification of Ukraine with Russia", referring to the Pereiaslav Agreement (discussed in the 7_Hetmanate note).
• Simultaneously, it drew upon the narrative of Crimea as a “city of Russian glory,” a concept born from the Crimean War (1853–56).
• These Russocentric historical narratives worked well to consolidate imperial identity but clashed after Ukraine exited Russia's orbit, creating friction with Ukraine’s evolving historical narrative.

Back to the Present

• The tension surrounding Crimea erupted in May 1992 when the Crimean parliament (the region had gained autonomous republic status and a separate parliament the previous year) declared the peninsula an independent state.
• The parliament also called for Ukraine to negotiate their relationship via a union treaty, adopted a constitution, and set a date for an independence referendum.
• Russian nationalists celebrated this move, and the Russian parliament escalated the situation by declaring the 1954 transfer unlawful and demanding negotiations over Crimea’s status.
• Ukraine’s response was twofold:
  • Externally, Kyiv refused to negotiate with Russia, denouncing its actions as interference in Ukraine's internal affairs.
  • Internally, Kyiv successfully pressured Crimean authorities to amend their constitution and cancel the independence referendum.
• Although this conflict was largely resolved without the use of force, neighboring Moldova faced a grimmer fate. In Transnistria, tensions between the central government and pro-Russian separatists escalated into open warfare involving Russian troops, resulting in the de facto separation of the enclave. (For more details on this conflict, I recommend Mark Galeotti's book: Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine).
• Crimea's tensions persisted, shifting into a conflict between the Russian parliament and President Yeltsin.
  • In July 1993, the Russian parliament passed a resolution claiming Sevastopol, the Black Sea Fleet's headquarters, as part of the Russian Federation.
  • Yeltsin condemned the resolution, stating he was ashamed of it and emphasizing that war with Ukraine was not an option.
• Later that year, Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk met to negotiate the Black Sea Fleet’s fate. Yeltsin demanded Ukraine sell the fleet to Russia to settle its debts for natural gas, warning that failure to comply would result in a supply cutoff.
  • Kravchuk reluctantly agreed out of concern for Ukraine's economy, but Ukraine’s parliament refused to ratify the agreement, viewing it as coerced.
• The Massandra Accords briefly shifted momentum in Yeltsin’s favor, as they gave him leverage over parliament just weeks before he ordered the shelling of the Duma building. (For more details, see the first chapter of 19_Independence and Divergence.) However, these accords failed to resolve the broader issue.
• The situation deteriorated further after nationalist and communist forces gained strength in the Russian Duma elections, emboldening Crimean separatists.
  • In 1994, Crimean separatists elected Yurii Meshkov as their president. Meshkov reinstated Crimean independence on the political agenda and set a new referendum date.
  • That same year, Sevastopol’s city council voted to accept Russian jurisdiction, driven by its economic reliance on Moscow and its continued role as the Black Sea Fleet's headquarters.

A solution is found

• The resolution of the Crimean issue was largely made possible by Ukraine’s democratic framework. In 1994, Leonid Kravchuk was replaced by Leonid Kuchma, who was highly popular among the Crimean population, receiving 90% of the vote across the peninsula and 92% in Sevastopol. As a Russian-speaking politician from southeastern Ukraine, Kuchma reassured ethnic Russian voters that his administration would safeguard their rights.
• Ukrainian officials also successfully negotiated a power-sharing agreement with the Crimean authorities. This agreement abolished the office of the Crimean president and aligned the region’s constitution and laws with those of the mainland.
• Russia's decision not to deploy the Black Sea Fleet in support of Crimean separatists, unlike their involvement in Transnistria, also played a significant role in the peaceful resolution of the conflict. Several factors contributed to this restraint:
  • Domestic Politics: Intervention could have been seen as Yeltsin capitulating to nationalist and communist forces in the Russian parliament.
  • Precedent Risks: Supporting Crimean separatists might have encouraged independence movements within Russia’s own autonomous republics, such as Tatarstan, which posed a significant risk to Russian territorial integrity.
  • Foreign Policy: Military involvement in Crimea would have undermined Yeltsin’s efforts to improve relations with the United States. This could have jeopardized their joint initiative to persuade Ukraine to relinquish its nuclear arsenal.

Budapest Memorandum

• From the outset of its independence, Kyiv was eager to embrace non-nuclear status but sought guarantees that its relinquished nuclear weapons wouldn’t leave it vulnerable to Russian aggression.
• In March 1992, amid heightened tensions over the Black Sea Fleet, Kravchuk halted shipments of tactical nuclear weapons to Russia. This decision alarmed not only Moscow but also Washington. Shipments resumed only after Ukrainian observers were allowed to monitor the destruction of the weapons.
• Two months later, in May, the United States pressured Ukraine into signing the Lisbon Protocol. This agreement obligated Ukraine to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear state and to become a signatory of START-1, a Soviet-American treaty aimed at reducing nuclear arsenals.
• However, ratification of START-1 stalled in the Ukrainian parliament in July 1993, largely due to escalating tensions with Russia, particularly after the Duma laid claim to Sevastopol.
• Further attempts by Yeltsin to coerce Ukraine into relinquishing its nuclear weapons—and the Black Sea Fleet—in exchange for settling Ukraine’s natural gas debt failed due to resistance from the Verkhovna Rada.
• These tensions over Crimea strengthened Ukraine’s resolve to use its nuclear arsenal as a bargaining chip in negotiations with Russia.

U.S. Involvement and Policy Evolution

• The United States’ approach to Ukrainian nuclear disarmament shifted between administrations. Under George H.W. Bush, the policy was to pressure all post-Soviet states into surrendering their nuclear weapons without exception. However, Bill Clinton’s presidency, which began in 1993, adopted a more nuanced approach. While the ultimate goal remained disarmament, Clinton’s administration sought to understand Ukraine’s concerns and offer compromises.
• In 1993, international relations scholar John Mearsheimer argued that Ukraine should retain its nuclear arsenal to deter Russian aggression, which he viewed as inevitable and disastrous for both Ukraine and Europe:

"Ukrainian nuclear weapons are the only reliable deterrent to Russian aggression. If the U.S. aim is to enhance stability in Europe, the case against a nuclear-armed Ukraine is unpersuasive."

• Although this perspective wasn’t adopted as U.S. policy, Clinton’s administration acknowledged Ukraine’s security concerns. They began offering financial compensation for disarmament and entertained the possibility of providing security assurances. Most importantly, the U.S. assumed a leading role in trilateral talks with Ukraine and Russia.

Negotiations and Agreements

• By late 1993, U.S.-led diplomacy bore fruit as the United States and Ukraine agreed on key principles for denuclearization:

  • Compensation: The U.S. pledged $1 billion to Ukraine for disarmament.
  • Nuclear Fuel: The U.S. and Russia jointly agreed to provide fuel for Ukraine’s nuclear power plants using dismantled warheads.
  • Security Assurances: Both nations committed to respecting Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty.

• These agreements formed the foundation for the Trilateral Statement, signed in January 1994. Subsequently, the Verkhovna Rada ratified the Lisbon Protocol in February, and in November, Ukraine acceded to the NPT as a non-nuclear state.

• In December 1994, Clinton and Kuchma signed the Budapest Memorandum. The memorandum contained security assurances from the United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom, later echoed by France and China. These assurances included commitments to:

"respect the Independence and Sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine."

"refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine."

Weaknesses of the Memorandum

• The Budapest Memorandum fell short of offering concrete guarantees. Its promises were limited to:
  • UN Action: Guarantors would "seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine" in the event of a nuclear attack.
  • Consultations: Guarantors would consult each other "in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments."
• While Ukrainians were hopeful, they were not naïve. Kuchma himself acknowledged its limitations:

"If tomorrow Russia goes into Crimea, no one will even raise an eyebrow."

Why Ukraine Signed

• Despite these shortcomings, Kuchma signed the agreement for two primary reasons:
  1. International Recognition: Disarmament was viewed as a pathway to greater international legitimacy.
  2. Domestic Instability: Ukraine faced severe internal challenges, including an economic crisis that saw GDP shrink by nearly a quarter in the previous year. Disarmament and the accompanying agreements provided a degree of stability amid this turmoil.

Aftermath

• The Budapest Memorandum and its accompanying treaties aimed to address the security gap left by Ukraine’s nuclear disarmament, relying on assurances from nuclear powers. However, these assurances, lacking binding guarantees, proved susceptible to the shifting political priorities of democratic nations. This vulnerability became evident during Russia’s invasions of Ukraine in 2014 and 2022, which highlighted how ineffective non-binding agreements can be in safeguarding territorial integrity.
• Despite their long-term limitations, the agreements provided Ukraine with significant short-term benefits.
  • Financially, the U.S. assistance that followed the signing of the Trilateral Statement helped Kuchma stabilize Ukraine’s economy, which had been on the brink of collapse.
  • Politically, the agreements reduced Yeltsin’s incentives to support Crimean separatists and strengthened his ability to counter nationalist forces in the Russian parliament who sought to undermine Ukraine’s sovereignty.
• In May 1997, Ukraine and Russia signed the Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership, known as the Friendship Treaty, which included Russia’s formal recognition of Ukraine’s territorial integrity within its post-Soviet borders.
  • This treaty was followed by a series of agreements that resolved disputes over the Black Sea Fleet and Sevastopol.
  • Under these agreements, Ukraine retained only 18% of the fleet, while the remainder went to Russia.
  • Additionally, Ukraine leased the Sevastopol naval base to Russia for 20 years. While this arrangement ultimately facilitated Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014, it represented the best deal Ukraine could negotiate at the time, given its economic turmoil and dependence on Russian oil and gas.
• Both the Budapest Memorandum and the Friendship Treaty made broad commitments to Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity, but they lacked enforcement mechanisms.
  • This weakness was apparent early on, as the Russian parliament took two years to ratify the Friendship Treaty due to opposition from nationalist and populist forces.
• Recognizing these limitations, Ukrainians themselves were skeptical of the treaties' ability to guarantee their security.
  • As the last nuclear warheads left Ukrainian territory, the government began exploring alternative security arrangements.
  • An example of such alternatives was found in Ukraine’s western neighbors. Poland and the Czech Republic, for instance, were invited to join NATO just months after Ukraine signed the Friendship Treaty. NATO membership effectively resolved these countries’ "Russia problem," providing a stark contrast to Ukraine’s precarious reliance on non-binding agreements.

Continuation

Continues in 20_Contact with Europe.

Sources

The information is derived from Serhii Plokhy's book: "The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History" (Pages 63-74).