20_Contact with Europe

This is the twentieth #generalhistory note, following 19_Independence and Divergence and 19_Problematic Divorce.

NATO Expansion

The Beginning

• In 1990, during discussions about Germany's future following the fall of the Berlin Wall, Secretary Baker made a deal with Mikhail Gorbachev. He promised not to expand NATO eastward in exchange for incorporating East Germany into NATO and providing aid to the Soviet Union.
• Gorbachev understood this as as an implicit commitment that NATO would never expand further east in Europe in return for letting East Germany into NATO. However, he did not clarify this assumption, as he was desperate for the promised aid.
• It is important to note that today, Gorbachev acknowledges that the deal only applied to East Germany. This makes sense, given that at the time, the non-NATO countries in Europe (apart from Austria and Switzerland, whose neutrality was solid and remains so) were still in the Warsaw pact.

“The topic of ‘NATO expansion’ was not discussed at all, and it wasn’t brought up in those years. … Another issue we brought up was discussed: making sure that NATO’s military structures would not advance and that additional armed forces would not be deployed on the territory of the then-GDR after German reunification. Baker’s statement was made in that context… Everything that could have been and needed to be done to solidify that political obligation was done. And fulfilled.”-Mikhail Gorbachev

• By then, the factors leading to the 18_Collapse of the Soviet Union were already present. Gorbachev was attempting to counteract them and had commissioned a plan to address these issues, which required substantial financial aid. Although he failed to secure this aid from the U.S., he hoped that financial support from Germany would sustain him long enough to persuade the Americans.
• However, this hope proved misplaced. In 1991, hardliners within the Communist Party attempted a coup against him, triggering the Soviet Union's collapse.
• Boris Yeltsin then came to power, as detailed in 19_Independence and Divergence, with serious consequences that were later blamed on the outside world.

After the Collapse

• In the U.S., the president faced a difficult decision. Russia was in chaos, and its instability threatened to drag down neighboring countries. These nations, historically scarred by Russian domination, sought security guarantees. However, any move to secure these countries could be perceived by Russia as aggressive meddling, potentially exacerbating its internal turmoil.
• President Bush decided against NATO expansion.
• President Clinton initially sought a compromise, establishing the Partnership for Peace (PfP). This organization allowed former Warsaw Pact countries, and even Russia, to engage in cooperative security measures without full NATO membership. The PfP enabled the U.S. to support democratic transitions in these nations and prepare them for potential NATO membership without alarming Russia.
• The PfP also reassured Ukraine that it would not be left without security guarantees during its denuclearization, as described in 19_Problematic Divorce.
• However, the PfP was insufficient for several Eastern European countries, which sought the full protection of NATO's Article 5.
• Poland was particularly proactive in seeking NATO membership. Among its efforts:
  1. Poland's president invited Yeltsin to a state dinner, got him drunk, and persuaded him to sign a letter accepting NATO membership for other countries, except Ukraine.
  2. When this failed, Poland hinted at pursuing nuclear weapons if it did not receive NATO's Article 5 protection.
  3. Prominent figures like Václav Havel (President of Czechoslovakia) and Lech Wałęsa (President of Poland) lobbied Republicans in Washington.
• This lobbying was significant, as upcoming U.S. presidential elections made Eastern European diaspora voters in swing states politically influential. After disastrous midterm elections, the Democrats feared losing further ground if Eastern European leaders campaigned for Republicans.
• Under this pressure, Clinton eventually announced that NATO membership was no longer a question of "if" but "when".

The Shift

• U.S. leaders believed Russia might tolerate NATO expansion, assuming it would prioritize countering China's growing influence. However, this reasoning was flawed. Russia viewed potential U.S.-China conflict as a reason to avoid aligning with the U.S., not as an incentive to cooperate.
• Russia's mixed signals about NATO expansion further complicated matters:
  • It expressed a preference for NATO to be replaced by a militarized OSCE.
  • It claimed concern not about NATO itself but about how Russian nationalists and voters would react.
  • It described NATO expansion as humiliating.
• The U.S. dismissed the humiliation argument, viewing it as a natural consequence of losing an empire. From the American perspective, creating empires was inherently wrong, and Russia needed to accept the repercussions.
• However, Clinton did not unilaterally announce NATO expansion. Recognizing that Russia had the means to obstruct it (as demonstrated in Moldova), Clinton sought Yeltsin's agreement.
• To secure this agreement, Clinton offered Yeltsin several concessions:
  • Billions of dollars in aid.
  • A promise not to deploy new weapons in new NATO member states.
  • A commitment against stationing major conventional forces or permanent bases in these countries.
  • An agreement to delay announcing NATO expansion until after Russia's 1996 presidential elections.
  • An invitation for Russia to join the G7, despite its questionable democracy and small economy (explored further in 19_Independence and Divergence). Clinton later told Ukraine's Leonid Kuchma that this was meant to show Yeltsin the benefits of cooperation among equals rather than domination.
• This strategy worked initially. Clinton announced NATO expansion in October 1996, too late to harm Yeltsin but soon enough to bolster his own reelection.
• NATO leaders also negotiated the NATO-Russia Founding Act and the Charter on a Distinctive Partnership with Ukraine. These agreements aimed to reassure Russia that NATO posed no threat and to assure Ukraine of NATO support against potential Russian aggression.

Escalation

• Relations soured after NATO's 1999 bombing of Yugoslavia, which Russia viewed as an intrusion into its sphere of influence. While NATO saw the intervention as necessary to prevent genocide in Kosovo, it bypassed UN Security Council approval due to Russian and Chinese vetoes.
• The bombing infuriated Russia's Prime Minister Primakov, who aborted a U.S. visit upon hearing the news.
• Russia severed ties with NATO and, after the bombing ceased, deployed forces to Priština, Kosovo's capital, demanding joint occupation with NATO. This symbolized their strained relationship: nominal allies but de facto rivals.
• This hostility carried over to both countries' successors, who adopted more aggressive stances.

Post expansion

Hopeful Beginning

• Surprisingly, the new millennium started with the promise of improving relations. The first sign of this was the phone call on September 9, 2001, when Vladimir Putin, the new president of Russia (the transition from Yeltsin to Putin is explored in detail in 19_Independence and Divergence), warned George W. Bush, the newly elected president of the United States, that according to his intelligence from Afghanistan (where a key Moscow ally had been assassinated by the Taliban), a major terrorist action was being planned.
• Two days later, 9/11 happened. Russia saw this as an opportunity to establish a friendly relationship with the U.S., envisioning collaboration on the war on terror. Russia viewed its role in this collaboration as fighting Chechen separatists (also discussed in detail in the note linked above).
• To that end, Putin visited Washington in November, where he proclaimed that this common cause could bring the two states closer to friendship. At the time, his vision consisted of Russia regaining the superpower status it had lost with the 18_Collapse of the Soviet Union, halting NATO expansion, and securing recognition of the post-Soviet states as being firmly within the Russian "sphere of influence". However, his official mission in Washington was to provide intelligence about Afghanistan.
• While the Bush administration was thankful for the support, it did not want to go as far as Putin hinted. In exchange for intelligence about Afghanistan and other gestures of goodwill, the U.S. was prepared to share information relevant to the war on terror, remain quiet about the brutalities occurring in Chechnya, and help Russia join the World Trade Organization.

The Rift Widens

• While cooperation worked for a while, cracks began to appear quite soon. Even in areas where they should have cooperated more smoothly, tensions emerged, such as the U.S. needing military bases in Central Asia, which Putin was reluctant to allow within his sphere of influence.
• Tensions rose further when Bush unilaterally withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, citing the need to defend against rogue states like Iran and North Korea. However, Putin perceived this as targeting Russia and subsequently withdrew from the START-2 Treaty of 1993, signed by George H. W. Bush and Boris Yeltsin.
• Putin’s attempt to influence NATO through the NATO-Russia Council also failed, as the alliance invited several new members in 2002, particularly the Baltic states.
• Then, in 2003, Bush decided to invade Iraq, a move criticized by Russia.
• Overall, the Bush administration's insistence on promoting democracy abroad threatened Putin's domestic stability while negatively impacting his foreign objectives.
• This was especially true in Eastern Europe, where U.S. support for new democracies clashed with Russia’s demands for a sphere of influence. Ukraine came to the forefront during the Orange Revolution when the Russian-backed candidate lost to a pro-Western leader following a recount of a rigged vote (detailed in 19_Independence and Divergence).
• In March 2004, the invited members (all democracies) mentioned three paragraphs above joined NATO, signaling a possible future of Ukraine joining.

Democracy Crusade

• After the fall of the Soviet Union, being democratic became a prerequisite for joining any Western alliance, whether military (NATO) or political/economic (EU). To that end, the Orange Revolution was frightening to Putin, as it showcased Ukrainian democracy functioning effectively—unlike Russian democracy.
• This was particularly true given that Viktor Yushchenko (the victor) was Western-leaning and won against Viktor Yanukovych, who was backed by Putin to the extent that he sent political advisors like Gleb Pavlovsky to aid him in the presidential campaign. To make matters worse, the revolution was supported by Boris Berezovsky, a former sponsor turned rival of Putin, who later fled the country.
• To return to the main point: the Orange Revolution brought to power a leader who wanted better relations with the West while proving the functionality of Ukrainian democracy, thus making stronger ties possible. Combined, these developments could embolden domestic democratic opposition in Russia and bring powerful Western institutions closer to Russia's borders—an unacceptable prospect for Putin.
• By this point, Putin was already well on his way to erecting an autocracy in Russia. In December 2003, United Russia, his party, won the Duma elections and gained a majority. He used the Beslan school hostage crisis in September 2004, which his security services mishandled, as a pretext to clamp down on the remaining democratic structures, ending elections of regional governors and curtailing the activities of political parties and NGOs.
• Putin preferred authoritarian leadership in Ukraine, as it was easier to coerce than a democratic system with rotating officials. To that end, he urged Kuchma to enact violence against protesters and supported Yanukovych. However, both attempts failed.
• A year before the Orange Revolution, the Rose Revolution brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power in Georgia. Similar democratic revolutions in Kyrgyzstan (Tulip Revolution) and Uzbekistan further strengthened Putin's suspicion that the West was using democracy to weaken him.
• In response, the Russian government created and funded youth organizations, with Nashi being the most notorious, aimed at defending the president against revolutions. Ukraine was seen as the main threat but only as a springboard for broader Western ambitions.
• Yushchenko’s election signaled a significant foreign policy shift. Upon taking office, he resumed the pro-Western policies Kuchma had pursued before the Melynchenko tape scandal (explored in 19_Independence and Divergence), seeking integration with Western institutions like the EU and NATO.
• He specifically requested a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for NATO. Eastern European states, eager to have Ukraine replace them as NATO's eastern flank, supported this request.
• Shortly after his inauguration, Yushchenko attended a NATO summit in Brussels, where he declared on behalf of the protesters:

"I’m pretty much sure, dear friends, that the people who went onto Kyiv’s squares and streets were motivated because they wanted to see Ukraine in Europe, not as a neighbor of Europe, because we are a country located in the center of Europe. And we would like to see Ukraine integrated into the European Union and into the North Atlantic Alliance.”- The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 85

• At the same time, he attempted to reassure Russia by stating:

“Russia is our strategic partner, and Ukraine’s policy toward NATO will by no means be against the interests of other countries, including Russia.”- The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 85

• This was an attempt to navigate the security dilemma Ukraine faced:
  • Accommodating Russia, their former colonial master, which had recently tried to intervene in their elections and was bent on keeping the country in its sphere of influence; or
  • Joining a military alliance that could guarantee its territorial integrity and sovereignty.
• With memories of Russian threats fresh and immediate, Ukraine ultimately chose the latter option.
• Russia responded by leveraging Ukraine's dependence on gas and its role as a transit country to Europe to create a wedge.
• After March 2005, shortly after Yushchenko’s Brussels speech, Russia raised gas prices, arguing that it was a general policy of cutting subsidies to former Soviet republics. However, this claim faltered as Belarus, a Russia-friendly state, received better terms.
• Gas prices for Ukraine rose sharply, from $50 to $230 per 1,000 cubic meters. Unable to pay, Ukraine faced supply cuts during the winter. Ukraine began diverting gas destined for Europe, prompting Moscow to threaten cutting all supplies to Europe.
• In 2006, Russia reduced Hungary’s gas supplies by 40 percent, France and Austria’s by 30 percent, and Italy’s by 24 percent.
• While this strained European-Ukrainian relations, it strengthened Yushchenko’s resolve to integrate further into Europe.

Bucharest Summit

• Relations between the U.S. and Russia deteriorated further in 2007 when Putin delivered a speech at the Munich Security Forum, in which he criticized the U.S. as the world's political leader, fully exploiting their precarious position after the Iraq invasion.
• In this speech, he condemned the invasion of Iraq, arguing that the U.S. was undermining the international order by acting unilaterally. He also criticized NATO expansion, stating:

“I think it is obvious that NATO expansion does not bear any relation to the modernization of the Alliance itself or to ensuring security in Europe. On the contrary, it represents a serious provocation that reduces the level of mutual trust.”- The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 87

• Putin further invoked the alleged promises made in 1990 not to expand NATO (which we discussed earlier in this document).
• NATO's response, as conveyed by its Secretary General at the time, was mostly one of disappointment, with a remark that Putin's speech was unhelpful.
• From the U.S., Senator John McCain responded:

“Moscow must understand that it cannot enjoy a genuine partnership with the West so long as its actions at home and abroad conflict so fundamentally with the core values of Euro-Atlantic democracies.” - The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 87

• Ukrainian President Viktor Yushchenko echoed the theme of democracy in a joint letter sent by him and other Ukrainian representatives in January 2008, requesting a Membership Action Plan (MAP):

“Fully sharing European democratic values, our state identifies itself as part of the Euro-Atlantic security area and is willing, together with NATO and partners thereof, to counteract common threats to security under equal conditions.”- The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 87

• Russia strongly opposed this, with Putin threatening:

“It is horrible to say and terrifying to think that Russia could target its missile systems at Ukraine, in response to the deployment of such installations on Ukrainian territory.”- The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 87

• In an attempt to placate Russia, Yushchenko later reassured:

"Can one imagine there will be a NATO base in Sevastopol? Of course not, and there never will be."

• Russia remained unsatisfied, viewing the move as a breach of good relations. The Russian Foreign Ministry stated:

“Apparently, today’s Ukrainian leadership considers closer ties with NATO as an alternative to good-neighborly relations with the Russian Federation.”- The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 87-88

• This stance was solidified in the "Foreign Policy Concept", published the same month, which claimed that Ukraine and Georgia's potential admission, along with the deployment of NATO military infrastructure, violated “the principle of equal security” and created “new dividing lines in Europe.” The document concluded that the Russian Federation "will be forced to use appropriate measures.”
• Russia was determined to block Ukraine's and Georgia's attempts to join NATO. Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s representative to the UN, even hinted that their relations with NATO could worsen further:

“Due to the fact that our relations with NATO are very challenging at present, I am not certain the alliance will extend an invitation to Ukraine.”- The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 88

On April 2, 2008, NATO heads of state met in Bucharest to discuss the alliance's future. Putin personally attended the NATO-Russia summit, again warning members against extending invitations to Ukraine and Georgia:

“The emergence of a powerful military bloc at our borders will be seen as a direct threat to Russian security.” - The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 88

• President Bush had already visited Kyiv before the summit, expressing U.S. support for Ukraine’s aspirations:

"Your nation has made a bold decision, and the United States strongly supports your request."- The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 88

• However, several Western European countries, including France and Germany, blocked the U.S.- and Eastern European-backed decision to grant Ukraine and Georgia a MAP. The summit declaration read:

"We agreed today that these countries will become members of NATO," - The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 89

• but it also admitted that no accession would occur in the near or medium future. The MAP was promised but not granted, with NATO citing the need for the aspirants to meet specific criteria:

"(W)e will now begin a period of intensive engagement with both at a high political level to address the questions still outstanding pertaining to their MAP applications."- The Russo-Ukrainian War, page 89

Aftermath

• The issue was postponed indefinitely and would not resurface at the next summit or the one after that. This decision was seen as a concession to Russia, given that Albania and Croatia were invited to join NATO at the same summit.
• Ukraine and Georgia understood this outcome as the worst possible scenario: they had publicly applied for NATO membership, alienating Russia, but their applications were deferred indefinitely, leaving them unprotected against potential Russian aggression.
• Their fears were realized on August 8, 2008, when Russia invaded Georgia (for details, see Mark Galeotti's book: Putin's Wars: From Chechnya to Ukraine; a brief overview follows). Russia claimed to be responding to Georgian military actions in South Ossetia, a province that had seceded in the early 1990s.
• However, the war is almost certainly tied to the Bucharest Summit. Shortly after Putin returned from Bucharest, Russia established official ties with South Ossetia and Abkhazia.
• While Georgian forces resisted under President Mikheil Saakashvili's leadership, Russia’s military superiority ultimately prevailed, with the conflict escalating to the point where Tbilisi was threatened with occupation.
• On August 12, Yushchenko, along with representatives from Poland and the Baltic states, traveled to Tbilisi to show solidarity with Georgia. That same day, a ceasefire was negotiated by Nicolas Sarkozy, then President of France, halting Russia's advance.
• Although Russian forces eventually withdrew from most of Georgia, they remained in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, ostensibly to protect their independence from Georgia, while effectively perpetuating the country’s territorial division.
• This war marked the first significant Russian military intervention beyond its borders and signaled to the West that Russia was willing to use force to halt NATO expansion. It also sent a clear message to other post-Soviet states that NATO would not intervene militarily if they were not members.
• The Bucharest Summit and the Georgian War dealt a significant blow to Ukraine’s aspirations to integrate with the West.

Attempted Reconciliation

• The 2008 U.S. elections brought Barack Obama to power, a fierce critic of George W. Bush’s policies. Obama opposed actions that alienated Russia but also questioned NATO expansion initiated under earlier administrations.
• Obama sought rapprochement with Russia through several key steps:
  • Announcing a "reset" of U.S.-Russia relations.
  • Signing a new START treaty aimed at reducing nuclear arms.
  • Reconsidering missile defense deployments in Europe.
• Most significantly, Obama modified U.S. positions on NATO membership, stating that prospective members required both public referenda and territorial integrity to join.
  • This effectively stalled NATO ambitions for Georgia and Ukraine. Georgia lacked territorial integrity, while Ukraine lacked majority public support for membership.
• The rapprochement saw initial success as Russia:
  • Agreed to nuclear arms reductions.
  • Allowed U.S. forces transit through Russian territory to Afghanistan.
  • Supported sanctions on Iran to pressure nuclear negotiations.
• Meanwhile, in January 2010, Ukraine elected Viktor Yanukovych as president after widespread disappointment with Viktor Yushchenko.
  • Yanukovych promptly removed NATO membership from Ukraine's foreign policy agenda.
  • He signed an agreement extending Russia's Black Sea Fleet lease in Sevastopol until 2042.

Putin's Eurasian Plan

• Vladimir Putin envisioned Russian security in terms reminiscent of Tsarist and Soviet strategies: through a buffer zone of states under Russian influence, fortified by natural barriers.
  • His goal was to create a Eurasian Union, dominated by Russia, encompassing key post-Soviet states.
  • Ukraine, given its size and economic importance, was central to this vision.
• Attempts at integration began under Boris Yeltsin through the CIS, but the CIS lacked momentum.
  • Putin revitalized these efforts by establishing the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC).
• A breakthrough came in 2003 when Ukraine signed an agreement to create a common economic space with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, despite its earlier refusal to join the CIS.
  • This alignment with Russia was a temporary response to Ukraine's domestic political crises and was later reversed under Yushchenko, who prioritized European integration.
• Yanukovych’s election in 2010 briefly eased integration efforts.
• In 2008, Putin circumvented constitutional term limits by becoming Prime Minister. In 2011, he publicized his vision for the Eurasian Union:
  • He described it as a "strong supranational union" capable of becoming a major global pole, bridging Europe and the Asia-Pacific.
• While the vision appealed to Russia’s post-Soviet neighbors, many were drawn instead to the EU.
  • Putin dismissed the dichotomy between the EU and the Eurasian Union as false, presenting the latter as compatible with Europe’s values of democracy and markets.
• By 2013, however, EU-Russia negotiations had faltered, and association agreements between the EU and post-Soviet states were deemed incompatible with Eurasian Union membership.
  • Armenia yielded to Russian pressure due to its reliance on Moscow in its conflict with Azerbaijan.
  • Georgia and Moldova resisted.
  • Ukraine, divided between pro-European and pro-Russian sentiments, became a focal point.
  • Without Ukraine, the Eurasian Union could not achieve the economic or geopolitical heft needed to rival Europe or China.

Ukrainian Domestic Politics

• Yanukovych reversed many of Yushchenko’s reforms in both domestic and foreign policy:
  • He leveraged parliamentary allies to restore presidential powers curtailed by Yushchenko, enabling him to consolidate authoritarian rule and expand systemic corruption.
  • Transparency International and other organizations documented the kleptocratic nature of his administration (Eurasianet report and Transparency International).
• Yanukovych abandoned NATO membership aspirations and extended Russia's lease in Sevastopol.
  • However, he maintained economic ties with the EU for pragmatic reasons:
    • Ukrainian exports, especially metallurgy from the Donbas, relied on EU markets.
    • Oligarchs who backed him had vested interests in trade with Europe and viewed the EU as a counterbalance to Yanukovych’s authoritarianism.
• Despite EU concerns over democratic backsliding, it offered Ukraine an association agreement contingent on market reforms and the release of political prisoners, including Yulia Tymoshenko.
  • Yanukovych resisted reforms, as they conflicted with his kleptocratic system.
  • Nevertheless, he sought to appear cooperative, hoping the agreement would boost his reelection prospects in 2015.
• Meanwhile, Moscow applied pressure, initiating a trade war that slashed Ukrainian exports by 10% and offering $15 billion in aid if Ukraine abandoned the EU deal.
• Facing economic collapse, Yanukovych capitulated.
• At the November 2013 EU summit in Vilnius, he abruptly declined to sign the association agreement, reportedly after a meeting with Putin.
• Shortly thereafter, Putin delivered on his promises, granting Ukraine discounted gas and financial aid.
• Putin declared Ukraine a strategic ally, but this apparent victory for Eurasian integration was short-lived—the Maidan protests erupted soon after.

Continuation

Continues in 21_Fighting for Freedom.

Sources

The information is derived from Serhii Plokhy's book: "The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History" (Pages 79-95), and this video by Sarcasmitron.