The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-1933 as a crime of genocide_a legal assessment

Year: 2009
Class: Source
Authors: V. A. Vasilenko

Title: The Ukrainian Holodomor of 1932-1933 as a crime of genocide: a legal assessment
URL
Zotero Link: PDF

Historical Quotes

• “The time has come when we no longer need mass repressions which, as is known, concern not only the kulaks but also individual peasants and collective farmers.” HistoricalQuotes/Orange
• “The most important thing now is Ukraine,” where affairs are going badly “along Party lines,” “Soviet lines,” and “GPU lines.” Accordingly, Stalin concluded, “If we do not straighten out the situation in Ukraine now, we could lose Ukraine.” HistoricalQuotes/Orange
• “[The policy of the Moscow leadership] aims at eliminating the Ukrainian problem within several months by sacrificing some ten to fifteen million people.” HistoricalQuotes/Orange
• “A Ukrainian Ukraine has been destroyed.” HistoricalQuotes/Orange
• “The people are now so weak that they will not be able to withstand this last blow of Moscow centralism.” HistoricalQuotes/Orange

Arguments Against Genocide

• “In essence they argue that Ukrainian peasants were not the only ones who died en masse on the boundless expanses of the Land of the Soviets, so it makes little sense to single out the genocidal nature of the Holodomor.” AntiGenocideArgument/Red
• Those who deny that the Holodomor was an act of genocide ask whether this intent was documented and whether there existed a premeditated plan as evidence of this intent. AntiGenocideArgument/Red
• “Researchers have failed to find a single document of the Soviet government or Central Committee of the Party that gave instructions to starve a specific number of peasants, Ukrainian or otherwise.” AntiGenocideArgument/Red
• It is erroneous to assert that the Holodomor-genocide started in Ukraine in 1933. AntiGenocideArgument/Red
• Reference is sometimes made to archival documents attesting to the assistance given to various regions, including Ukraine. AntiGenocideArgument/Red
• It is often claimed that the Ukrainian Holodomor was not a crime of genocide because it lacked an exclusively national dimension, that is, the victims of the famine included not only Ukrainians but also the national minorities that lived in Ukraine at that time. AntiGenocideArgument/Red
• “The terror by famine that Stalin implemented in Ukraine and the Kuban was a genocide of Ukrainian citizens but not of Ukrainians.” AntiGenocideArgument/Red
• No one – neither the descendants of Ukrainian citizens who starved to death nor the international community – can prove that the extermination of Ukrainians was similar to the extermination of the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire in 1915 or of the Jews in Nazi-occupied Europe. AntiGenocideArgument/Red
• Since the famine of 1932–1933 on the territory of the Russian Federation was not considered to be genocide, the famine in Ukraine cannot be considered genocide either. AntiGenocideArgument/Red

Arguments For / Rebuttals

• “Ignores the national dimension of the Ukrainian Holodomor now proven by authoritative studies (Conquest, Mace, Graziosi).” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Any unbiased person would recognize the intentional elimination of millions of Ukrainian peasants (1932–1933) as a crime against humanity.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “1948 Convention does not require a document as evidence of criminal plan or intent.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Even Nazi Germany implemented genocide under the guise of a ‘final solution.’” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Planning excessive farm produce confiscation is tantamount to planning the Holodomor.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Bolshevik leaders fully understood that continued procurement would precipitate famine and doom millions.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Genocide does not require a quantitative threshold; 1948 Convention lacks victim numbers as a legal element.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “1932–1933 famine in Ukraine and Kuban was directed against the Ukrainian nation unlike other USSR famines.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Arbitrary confiscation of all food proves intent to precipitate famine as extermination.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Additional evidence shows regime intended to use famine to exterminate Ukrainian peasants as part of the nation.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Regime’s efficiency in organizing and ending famine shows intent was implemented with strict time limits.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Aid was too late, limited, selective, often seed stock rather than food.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Aid aimed at production, not saving peasants.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Peasants outside Ukraine starved as social class; Ukrainians starved for national affiliation.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Three-quarters of Kuban population were Ukrainians, despite being Russian citizens.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Genocide targets national, ethnical, racial, or religious groups; Ukrainians targeted for national affiliation.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Stalin feared Ukrainian national renaissance; pre-emptive strike against the nation.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Legal relevance is conformity with 1948 Convention, not identical features with other genocides.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “National minorities perished too, but genocide directed against Ukrainians.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Holocaust also targeted other groups but recognized as genocide of Jews.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “No convincing evidence equates Russian famine with Holodomor.” ProGenocideArgument/Green
• “Famine used to exterminate and destroy Ukrainian identity.” ProGenocideArgument/Green

Supplemental Information

• “OGPU report (1931–1932) documented food shortages and starvation in multiple Ukrainian SSR regions (Kharkiv, Kyiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, Vinnytsia).” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Euphemisms such as ‘food shortages’ and ‘hunger’ were commonly used in reports.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Famine onset in late 1931 escalated through 1932 due to communist leadership negligence.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “1932–1933 grain quotas of 5.8 million tonnes remained excessive as productivity declined.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Adoption of these quotas effectively sanctioned the extermination of peasants.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “A humane response would have involved reducing quotas, halting requisitions, declaring a humanitarian catastrophe, and providing aid.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Regime persisted in procurements using repressive measures, confiscating all available food.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Grain stored as in-kind stock was redirected to procurement reserves.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Grain advance payments and wages in grain were seized.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Resolution of 6 Dec 1932 blacklisted villages accused of quota sabotage.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Entire districts were blacklisted, ghettoized, deprived of essentials, fined, and repressed.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Telegram of 1 Jan 1933 instructed intensified searches and confiscations.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Ukrainian peasants were prohibited from leaving the republic.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Starving peasants were deliberately denied access to food outside Ukraine.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Party and Soviet leaders attempting to aid peasants with reserves faced repression.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Grain reserves of state funds were withheld from Ukraine.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Despite mass starvation, Ukrainian food products were exported domestically and abroad.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Stalin’s regime denied the famine and refused foreign or diaspora aid.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Regime control over famine confirms its artificial nature.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Ending the famine required cancellation of grain procurements.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Aid via soup kitchens was limited to working collective farmers.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• “Hospital treatment and food were restricted to healthier patients.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Selective distribution of aid meant millions excluded. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Leninist-Stalinist leadership considered Ukraine central to Soviet empire viability. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Ukrainianization linked to liberation movement/UPR legacy, alarming Kremlin. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Ukrainian separatism seen as grave concern. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• 30,000+ Ukrainians (mainly intellectual elite) repressed during/after Union for Liberation trial. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• 4,098 insurrections involving >1 million people occurred in Ukraine. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Potential nationwide upheaval feared, used to justify anti-Ukrainian repression. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Uprising date coincided with Holodomor peak. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Situation assessment exaggerated. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Holodomor/repressions seen as preemptive punitive operation undermining Ukrainian nation. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Ukrainians comprised overwhelming rural majority (>90% in some regions). SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Holodomor planned as stage against Ukrainian nation’s self-determination. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Ukrainian peasantry formed the basis of Ukrainian nation. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Target of Holodomor was Ukrainian national group. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Stalin’s regime aimed at exterminating peasants as a social class and Ukrainian nation as such. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Russian peasants also starved, but regime not interested in exterminating Russian nation. [SupplementalInfo/Yellow](p. 26, zotero://open-pdf/library/items/4VZVQDUM?page=26&annotation=NRPNB77Z) SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Ukrainian nation seen as system-destroying element by both empires. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Severest repressive famine measures applied in Ukraine/Kuban. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Kuban singled out with Ukraine in Kremlin documents. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Lower Volga peasants suffered less than Ukraine/Northern Caucasus. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Only Ukraine and Kuban peasants were prevented from leaving to seek food. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Regime linked grain procurements in Ukraine/Caucasus to Ukrainianization. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Resolution ordered expulsion of “Petliura’s followers” and “bourgeois nationalists.” SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Anti-Ukrainian press campaigns coincided with expropriations. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• Mortality rate in Ukraine/Kuban exceeded natural rate many times over. SupplementalInfo/Yellow
• 42 districts in Ukraine repopulated with settlers from Russia/Belarus after famine deaths. SupplementalInfo/Yellow

Legal References

• Under international law, extermination includes deprivation of food and medicine. LegalReference/Purple
• Genocide’s socio-legal character lies in intent to destroy national, ethnic, racial, or religious groups as civilizational elements. LegalReference/Purple
• Attempts to reinterpret the 1948 Convention for Soviet genocide are counterproductive. LegalReference/Purple
• Genocide requires proof of special intent (dolus specialis). LegalReference/Purple
• Crime must be committed against a defined group as such. LegalReference/Purple
• Distinctive feature of genocide: extermination of groups defined in 1948 Convention due to group affiliation. LegalReference/Purple
• Decisive factor in genocide qualification is proof of special intent. LegalReference/Purple
• Famine elsewhere in USSR constituted extermination, not genocide. LegalReference/Purple
• Nation, not ethnic minorities, is subject of self-determination under international law. LegalReference/Purple
• Murder of minorities during Holodomor was extermination, not genocide. LegalReference/Purple
• Draft Law “On the Holodomor” initially used “nation”; Speaker Moroz changed it to “people.” LegalReference/Purple
• Law “On the Holodomor” should be amended to conform with Art. 442 Criminal Code of Ukraine and Article II of 1948 Convention. LegalReference/Purple